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Abstract
We conduct experiments with human subjects in a model with
a positive production externality in which productivity is a nonde-
creasing function of the average level of employment of other firms.
The model has three steady states and a sunspot equilibrium that
fluctuates between the high and low steady states. Steady states are
payoff ranked: low values give lower profits than higher values. We
investigate whether subjects can learn a sunspot equilibrium. We ob-
serve coordination on the extrinsic announcements in our experimental
economies. Cases of apparent convergence to the low and high steady
states are also observed.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we present an experimental study of a model with multiple
payoff-rankable equilibria, including a sunspot equilibrium. The objective
of this work is to explore whether subjects can coordinate on a sunspot
equilibrium and under what circumstances such coordination arises.1
The possibility of multiple rational expectations equilibria (REE) is a
central issue in macroeconomics, raising the question of coordination and
forcefully emphasizing the importance of expectations. In models with mul-
tiple REE the equilibria typically include stationary sunspot equilibria (SSE)
solutions, in which agents’ actions are conditioned on an extraneous random
variable (Cass and Shell (1983)). This phenomenon can be found, for ex-
ample, in overlapping-generations models of money, real business cycle-type
models with non-convexities, New Keynesian models, endogenous growth
models, and monetary search models. SSEs provide an interpretation of eco-
nomic fluctuations as at least in part due to self-fulfilling changes in household
and firm expectations.
A question of considerable interest in macroeconomics is whether agents
can coordinate on SSEs. For example, Farmer (1999) and Clarida et al.
(2000) have argued that SSEs may provide an explanation for business cycle
fluctuations. Sunspot-driven fluctuations are more plausible in models in
which SSEs are stable under adaptive learning. This possibility has been
demonstrated by Woodford (1990), Evans and Honkapohja (1994), Evans et
al. (1998), Honkapohja and Mitra (2004), Evans et al. (2007), Shea (2013),
McGough, Meng and Xue (2013), as well as in numerous other papers.
The potential importance of SSEs continues to generate interest. For
example, in the context of multiple steady states due to the interest-rate
zero lower bound, stressed by Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2001),
the possible relevance to the Great Recession of the existence of associated
SSEs has been emphasized by Mertens and Ravn (2014). In a new generation
1Experimental studies of models with multiple equilibria have been done in different
environments, including overlapping generations models with money (Marimon and Sunder
(1993, 1994, 1995), Lim et al (1994), Arifovic (1995, 1996), simultaneous games (Cooper
et al. (1990, 1992))), effort coordination games (van Huyck et al. (1990)), optimal growth
models with nonconvex production technology (Lei and Noussair (2007)), and bank runs
(Garratt and Keister (2009), Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009)), Corbae and Duffy (2008),
Arifovic et al. (2012)). Duffy (2016) and Arifovic and Duffy (2018) provide surveys of this
literature.
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of bubbles models, SSEs have recently been suggested as a source of asset
price volatility – see Gali (2014), Farmer (2015) and Miao, Shen and Wang
(2018).
Given this background, although there is of course important related lit-
erature discussed below, there has been relatively little research on SSEs in
experimental macro settings. Our aim, therefore, is to determine whether it
is possible for subjects in an experimental setting to coordinate on an SSE
within a simple and transparent economy. The sunspot equilibria we consider
are in the spirit of macroeconomic models that obtain cyclical fluctuations
in settings in which multiple equilibria arise through strategic complemen-
tarities, externalities or monopolistic competition. Examples include the
coordination failure models of Cooper and John (1988), the ”animal spirits”
model of Howitt and McAfee (1982) based on transactions externalities, and
the multiplicities and sunspot equilibria found in non-convex real business
cycle and endogenous growth models when positive production externalities
or monopolistic competition are present, as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
or Evans et al. (1998).
Because in experiments it is crucial to keep the setting simple, we develop
a stripped-down, essentially static, framework in which a positive production
externality leads to the existence of multiple steady states and sunspot equi-
libria. We also ensure that the decision the subjects need to make each period
is simple and transparent: to forecast aggregate employment. Although the
framework is very simple, this makes it possible to study whether agents can
coordinate on a sunspot equilibrium in which there are economic fluctuations
of the type found in the macroeconomic literature just cited.
The model has three steady states. In the language of the macro learn-
ing literature, the low-employment and high-employment steady states are
E-stable (and thus stable under adaptive learning rules), while the middle
steady state is not E-stable. There also exists an E-stable sunspot equilib-
rium on which we concentrate in our experiments. This sunspot equilibrium
involves fluctuations between values near the two E-stable steady states, i.e
between low and high steady states. These two steady states are payoff
ranked: the high-employment steady state has higher profits than the low-
employment steady state does. This feature presents an additional challenge
for coordination on a sunspot equilibrium because it implies switching from
high-payoff to low-payoff outcomes.
The payoff rankability of the certainty equilibria motivates two different
experimental treatments. In the first, the subjects’ payoff is based on prof-
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its, which presents the challenge discussed above. In the second treatment,
the subjects’ payoff is based on the forecasting accuracy of their forecasts
(forecast squared error), and thus the two certainty equilibria are not payoff-
ranked in this case. These two treatments allow us to address question of
whether it is easier to coordinate on sunspot equilibria if they yield the same
payoffs as certainty equilibria.
Our motivation for using two treatments with different payoffs based on
profits and forecast squared error is also based on the observation about
accuracy of inflation expectations of firms and consumers relative to the ac-
curacy of inflation expectations of professional forecasters. Although these
stylized facts relate to inflation expectations, we believe that the underlying
link to the optimization function of these agents is relevant to our under-
standing of expectations about employment in our experiments. Based on
the firm survey in New Zealand, Coibion et al. (2018) document that in-
flation expectations of firm managers are higher than those of professional
forecasters and exhibit more disagreement than those of professional fore-
casters. Ehrmann et al. (2015) show that household inflation expectations
in Michigan Survey of Consumers are above those of professional forecasters.
Coibion et al. (2018) argue that inaccuracy in firms forecasts could be at-
tributed to the inattention linked to the characteristics of the firms such as
duration until the next price change, slope of the profit function and share
of exports in their sales. In other words, firms do not pay attention to the
dynamics in aggregate inflation because it is not directly linked to their de-
cision making which determines their payoffs – profits. Similar reasons were
suggested to explain bias in consumers inflation expectations – they care
about inflation for their own consumption bundle, not aggregate level. Pro-
fessional forecasters, on the other hand, care directly about the accuracy of
their forecasts, and, therefore, their forecasts are more accurate than those
of firms or consumers. In our experiments, we implement two treatments
with different payoffs to capture different optimization functions – profits for
firms and forecast squared error for professional forecasters. Our hypothesis
is that forecasts are more accurate in the treatment with payoff based on the
forecast squared error than forecasts in the treatment with payoff based on
the profits. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis.
The main result of our experiments is that subjects can coordinate on
sunspot announcements in both treatments. We also observe coordination on
high- and low-employment steady states where subjects disregarded sunspot
announcements. While the experiments show frequent examples of coordi-
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nation on the sunspot announcements in both treatments, in the treatments
with forecasting accuracy, the subjects’ forecasts and outcomes are closer to
the equilibria corresponding to the announcement, i.e. the coordination is
more accurate (consistent with the hypothesis outlined above). We should
note that less accurate forecasts in our profit treatment can be attributed
partly to the flatness of the profit function, consistent with the finding in
Coibion et al. (2018) that firms with with steeper profit function make
smaller forecast errors.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe related lit-
erature. In section 3, we describe the model. In section 4, we present the
design of the experiments. Section 5 describes the results of the experiments,
followed by section 6 which presents the discussion of adaptive learning in
the experiments. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
There are several related papers in the experimental literature that have
looked for sunspot equilibria in different settings. Marimon et al. (1993)
perform an experimental study based on the overlapping generations model
with money. For an appropriate specification of preferences, this model can
have multiple regular perfect foresight cycles and sunspots.2 In their set-
up the model has a unique steady-state equilibrium and a two-period cycle
equilibrium (which can be viewed as a perfect foresight sunspot). Marimon
et al. (1993) find that while the presence of extrinsic shocks (sunspots) is not
sufficient in itself to generate cyclic patterns in behavior, cyclic behavior is
observed when agents are trained to experience it together with a sunspot at
the beginning of the experiment. During training periods, the cyclic behavior
is achieved by a real shock to the number of agents in a generation that
amounts to varying endowments; this shock is not observable by the subjects.
The change in the number of agents is accompanied by a sunspot - a blinking
square of a corresponding color on the computer screen. The number of
agents in a generation is kept fixed after the training period, but the colored
square continues to appear on the screens during the input stage and during
the display of the results. The display of history is also color-coded. Marimon
et al. (1993) find that the price fluctuations are smaller during the experiment
than those during the training periods, but that the price fluctuations persist.
2See, for example Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986).
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Thus there appears to be coordination on a cyclic equilibrium, though it is
difficult to tell, given the length of the experiments, how long this cyclic
behavior would continue. The cyclic behavior tends to trail off towards the
end, and thus it is not clear that the SSEs are durable.
Duffy and Fisher (2005) study sunspot equilibria in a microeconomic set-
ting in which heterogeneity of agents, both buyers and sellers, plays a central
role, and motivates trades. They consider two mechanisms that have differ-
ent information flows: the closed-book call market and double auction. In
their set-up, the marginal valuations of buyers and marginal costs of sell-
ers depend on the median price, and thus the payoffs of agents depend on
the actual price realized in the market. This feature turns the set-up into a
coordination game, with two equilibria, but by design the two equilibria are
not Pareto rankable: some subjects are better off in one equilibrium, whereas
other subjects are better off in the other equilibrium. Duffy and Fisher (2005)
find that subjects can coordinate on a sunspot equilibrium based on a public
announcement, though this result is sensitive to semantics, i.e. the wording
of the announcements, and institutions: sunspot equilibria are observed in
all sessions with call markets, but in less than half of the sessions with double
auction.
Fehr et al. (2018) study a two-player coordination game with multiple
equilibria: players pick a number between zero and one hundred, and the pay-
offs are determined as the squared deviations from the other player’s choice.
All equilibria have the same payoff, but choosing 50 is a risk-dominant equi-
librium. Fehr et al. (2018) use public and/or private signals of different
precision and study experimentally how they affect which equilibrium sub-
jects coordinate on3. Their sunspots are semantically salient (they are the
numbers just like the strategies) and they do not have training periods which
distinguishes this paper from Marimon et al. (1993), Duffy and Fisher (2005)
and ours. They find that sunspot equilibria arise endogenously in case of pub-
lic signals that are easy to aggregate. They also observe sunspot-like behavior
in case of highly correlated private signals. When both public and private
signals are provided, full coordination on public signal is disturbed as some
subjects condition their decisions on private signals. In our setup, we have
3The global games literature has shown that the existence of multiple equilibria, in
coordination-type games, is sensitive to the presence of private and public signals (for
example, Heinemann et al. (2004)). These signals can in effect operate as sunspots.
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only public announcements, and our sunspot announcements are less seman-
tically salient (”Low/high employment is forecast this period”) than in Fehr
et al. (2018) as the announcement does not specify the values of low/high
employment. In our model sunspot equilibrium is payoff-dominated by the
high-employment equilibrium, while in Fehr et al. (2018) sunspot equilibria
do not present welfare losses.
Beugnot et al. (2012) show that in a coordination game with two strate-
gies with payoff-ranked equilibria the subjects coordinate on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium in the treatment without sunspots. The introduction
of sunspots disrupts the coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium
and leads to off-equilibrium outcomes (’dis-coordination’). However, sub-
jects never coordinate on the payoff-dominated equilibrium4. This study
has one feature in common with our paper – payoff-rankability of certainty
equilibria; however, this study is based on a normal form game with two
strategies, while ours is based on a macroeconomic model with a continuum
of strategies. In addition, coordination on a sunspot is not observed in their
experiment.
There are also experimental studies of correlated equilibrium, a concept
that is related to sunspot equilibrium. For example, Duffy and Feltovich
(2010) study the game of Chicken with private third-party recommendations
and show that subjects follow the third-party recommendations if they are
derived from a correlated equilibrium which is payoff-enhancing relative to
Nash equilibria. While related, the concept of private recommendations in
the context of correlated equilibrium in their study is different from public
sunspot announcements in ours. In our paper, the signal is publicly an-
nounced and informs all subjects about the forecast that is randomly gener-
ated. This is different from private recommendations of strategies to subjects.
Furthermore, while in Duffy and Feltovich (2010) subjects only coordinate
on correlated equilibrium that is payoff-enhancing relative to Nash equilib-
ria, our subjects are able to coordinate on the sunspot equilibrium which is
payoff-dominated by the high-employment equilibrium.
The focus of our paper is different, and motivated instead by the macro
literature. We look at a simple macro set-up with a positive production exter-
nality and multiple steady states. In this setting there exist SSEs, and only
4Previous experimental work without sunspots has shown convergence to payoff-
dominated equilibria in both normal form games (for example, Cooper et al. (1990),
Van Huyck et al. (1990)) and optimal growth model with increasing returns (Lei and
Noussair (2007)).
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a subset of these SSEs can be locally stable under adaptive learning rules.
We are interested in whether, in this context, adaptively stable SSEs can
be reached and sustained experimentally in the lab. In line with the macro
literature, in which it is plausible that agents may not have complete knowl-
edge of the full economic structure, we provide qualitative but incomplete
quantitative information to subjects of the specification of the economy.
Our experiments are also related to the experimental studies of expecta-
tions formation. In these studies, subjects also do not know the underlying
structure of the economy and need to form expectations of endogenous vari-
ables using observed past realizations in the economy. For the surveys of
this macro experimental literature see Duffy (2016) and Arifovic and Duffy
(2018).
Within the general literature, our work is closest to Marimon et al. (1993)
and Duffy and Fisher (2005), both of which study experimentally whether
the equilibrium selection can be driven by extraneous public announcements.
Like Marimon et al. (1993), we use a macroeconomic setting to generate
sunspots, but in contrast to their framework, which looks at SSEs near cycles
in a neighborhood of the indeterminate steady state, in particular at SSEs
near a 2-period cycle, we look at SSEs near a pair of distinct steady states.
Duffy and Fisher (2005) also look at SSEs near distinct equilibria, but in
our setting the steady states are Pareto rankable. Also we do not require
heterogeneity of agent types, and thus the sunspot equilibria that we examine
have the interpretation of switches between high and low levels of aggregate
output, resulting from waves of optimism or pessimism driven by extraneous
public announcements.
3 Model
3.1 Description of the economy
We use a simple, stylized macroeconomic set-up in which production exter-
nalities can generate multiple steady states and SSEs. Our framework is
characterized by the contemporaneous production externality in which pro-
ductivity of a firm is increased, over a range, by higher activity in other
firms.5
5Our set-up is closely related to the “Increasing Social Returns” overlapping generations
model described on pp. 72-81 in Evans and Honkapohja (1995). To keep the framework
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In period t, each firm hires workers, nt, to produce output, yt using the
production function
(1) yt = ψt
√
nt,
where ψt indexes productivity. Profit for the firm is computed as output
minus labor costs. The cost of a unit of labor is wage w, and thus the firm
maximizes profit
(2) Πt = ψt
√
nt − wnt,
The level of productivity ψt depends on the average level of employment
across all other firms (not including firm’s own employment)6. We will call
average employment of other firms Nt. The firm decides on employment,
nt, before knowing productivity, ψt, because it does not know the average
employment of other firms, Nt, when its decision is made. A firm is more
productive when other firms are operating at a high level of employment.7
Specifically, productivity, ψt, depends on the average employment of other
firms, Nt, as follows
8:
ψt = 2.5 when Nt ≤ 11.5
ψt = 2.5 + (Nt − 11.5) when 11.5 < Nt < 13(3)
ψt = 4 when 13 ≤ Nt
This model can be thought of as a very simple and stylized macroeconomic
model, with a single consumption good, no capital or other means of saving,
as simple as possible, for laboratory experiments, we use a version that eliminates the
dynamic optimization problem required in overlapping generations set-ups, and instead
focuses entirely on the contemporaneous production externality.
6Another alternative would be to make ψt depend on the average level of employment
of all firms. Neither implementation matters in a rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
(under competitive assumptions) but they can affect the behavior of the experimental
economy as will be discussed later.
7As emphasized by Farmer (1999) in the context of RBC models, perfect competition
with positive production externalities is formally equivalent to increasing returns to scale
production combined with monopolistic competition; for the laboratory model we employ
a simple version of the production externality used in Evans and Honkapohja (1995).
8Lei and Noussair (2007) study an environment similar to ours. The productivity in
their model depends on the aggregate level of capital: if aggregate capital is above the
threshold, productivity is high; if aggregate capital is below the threshold, the productivity
is low. They find that experimental economies can get into poverty traps with low levels
of capital and output.
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and in which household utility is such that labor supply is infinitely elastic
at wage w.9 Firms are owned by households and profits are distributed as
dividends back to the households each period. Note that, because we have a
repeated static equilibrium model, the household problem is trivial: supply
the labor demanded by firms at wage w and consume all income, generated
by wages and dividends. In the experiments we therefore focus solely on the
firm problem within this setting.
3.2 Equilibria






Depending on the parameters there are (generically) one or three perfect
foresight steady states. Within each of the three steady states, all firms
hire the same quantity of labor and produce the same level of output. For
productivity function (3) and with wages w = 0.5, this model has 3 steady
states: nL = 6.25 (“low-level”), nM = 12.54 and nH = 16 (“high-level”).
When there are three steady states, stationary sunspot equilibria (SSE)
exist between any pair of steady states. For example, in the experiments we
randomly generate announcements of “high” and “low” forecasted employ-
ment. Letting At ∈ {L,H} denote the announcement at time t, where L rep-
resents the announcement “Low employment is forecasted this period” and
H denotes the announcement “High employment is forecasted this period”,
there exists an SSE nt = nL if At = L and nt = nH if At = H. Other SSEs
also exist, including those switching between other pairs of steady states or
between all three steady states, as well as the three steady states themselves
in which employment is independent of the announcement.10
Changes in the wage w, as well as changes in employment subsidies or
taxes that alter the “effective” wage rate, can bifurcate the system. (Wage
9It would be straightforward to generalize the model to allow for less than fully elastic
labor supply, as is done in Evans and Honkapohja (1995).
10Equilibria or SSEs can be constructed that depend on any observable, e.g. equilibria
can be constructed that switch between steady states values depending on calendar time
or on the past history of aggregate employment. These equilibria can be viewed as limiting
SSE. There also exists an SSE in which nt = nL if At = H and nt = nH if At = L.
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subsidies or taxes are assumed offset by lump-sum taxes or subsidies, respec-
tively so that the combined effect is revenue neutral).
When w = 1 only the “low-level” steady state exists, and when w = 0.2
only the “high-level” steady-state exists. There do not exist SSEs when the
effective wage is such that only a single interior steady state exists. In this
study, we concentrate on the issue of coordination on SSE, and so we use
w = 0.5.
We now take up the issue of which equilibria are stable under simple
adaptive learning rules that have been widely studied in the macro learning
literature.
3.3 Temporary equilibrium framework and E-stability
Sunspot-driven fluctuations are more plausible in models in which SSEs are
stable under adaptive learning (Woodford (1990), Evans and Honkapohja
(1994), Evans et al. (1998), and Evans et al. (2007)). In our setting only
a subset of the existing SSEs can be locally stable under adaptive learning
rules. In this section, we establish which SSE is adaptively stable, and we
concentrate on it in our experiments.
The optimal choice of n in equation (4) depends on the firm’s expectations
of ψ. As ψ depends on the average employment of other firms, Nt (equation
3), the optimal choice of n equivalently depends on the firm’s expectation of
Nt.
If we now drop rational expectations and also the assumption of homo-
geneous expectations, then the model equations are as follows. In period t,
firm i chooses its employment level as: nit = (
ψe,it
2w
)2 where the superscripts
e, i denote the expectations of agent i.
Average employment of other firms for firm i is given by






where there are K firms, and the actual current productivity level of firm i











Thus, given the profile of time t expectations {ψe,it }Ki=1, the above equations
determine nit, N
i
t and Yt. The profit of firm i at time t is given by





We have so far assumed that the expectations of agents are specified in terms
of ψe,it . However, since ψt is a monotonic function of Nt (equation 3), it is
equivalent to specify expectations in terms of Nt
e,i
. That is, given the profile
of time t expectations {Nt








Figure 1 shows a firm’s optimal choice of employment as a function of the
firm’s forecast, as given by equation (7). The above equations then determine
N it , Yt and profits Π
i
t.
Because, in our set-up, there are multiple equilibria, including steady
states and SSEs, a natural question is: which equilibria are stable under
learning? We now briefly examine the stability properties under simple adap-
tive learning schemes.11 For convenience (this is not essential) assume that
firms have homogeneous expectations Nt
e,i
= N̄ ft concerning the average level
of employment of other firms. Their corresponding forecast of their own pro-
ductivity is then ψ(N̄ ft ) and the optimal choice of employment for each firm
is therefore





This is the map illustrated for our numerical example in Figure 1. The fixed
points of this map correspond to the perfect-foresight steady states.
Under adaptive learning, consider first the case in which announcements
are not present and agents believe they are in a (possibly noisy) steady state
in which the average employment of other firms is N̄ f = N̄ f + ηt, where ηt is
an independent zero mean random variable. Each period t they revise their
forecasts of average employment of other firms, which they use to determine
their employment in period t, according to the adaptive rule
N̄ ft = N̄
f
t−1 + γt(N̄t−1 − N̄
f
t−1),
11For details and further discussion of adaptive learning see Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
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where γt are the “gain” parameters, which might, for example, be fixed at
a number γ such that 0 < γt = γ < 1.
12 This learning rule is a recursive
update of expectations based on the past average of average employment
of other firms, N̄ . This type of beliefs and their recursive representation is
frequently used in the learning literature. It can be shown that a steady state




t, for all i, t, is locally stable under learning if and only if
the derivative T ′(n̄) < 1. This is known as the E-stability condition.13
Thus when there are three steady states nL < nM < nH , steady states
n̄ = nL, nH are locally stable, while n̄ = nM is not locally stable under
learning. Here “local” means that initial expectations are sufficiently close
and “stable” means that N̄ ft → n̄ as t → ∞. While the stated result is
asymptotic, the tendency toward convergence should be visible in finite time,
in particular for experiments.
The learning rule just described assumes that agents do not condition
on announcements. We now turn to that possibility. The adaptive learning
rule then is as follows. Let N̄Hft denote the time t forecast of the average
employment of other firms if At, the announcement at t, is H and let N̄
Lf
t
denote the time t forecast of the average employment of other firms if At,




t−1 + γt(N̄t−1 − N̄
Hf




t−1 if At = L,
N̄Lft = N̄
Lf
t−1 + γt(N̄t−1 − N̄
Lf




t−1 if At = H,
where again, for convenience, we are here assuming homogeneous expecta-
tions.
The optimal choice of employment, given these expectations is
nt = T (N̄
Hf
t ) if At = H and nt = T (N̄
Lf
t ) if At = L.
It can be shown that an SSE between two steady states is E-stable, and hence
locally stable under learning, if and only if both steady states are themselves
E-stable. Thus an SSE fluctuating between nL and nH is E-stable, since
T ′(nL) < 1 and T
′(nH) < 1, while sunspots fluctuating between nL and nM
or between nH and nM are not stable under learning. Sunspot fluctuations
12We need to assume that
∑∞
t=1 γt = +∞.
13We exclude from consideration nongeneric cases in which T ′ (n̄) = 1 for a steady state
n̄.
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between high and low steady states are locally asymptotically stable in the
sense that N̄Hft → nH and N̄
Lf
t → nL as t→∞, provided initial conditional
expectations for At = L,H are sufficiently close to the two steady state
values, and provided both announcements are generated infinitely often over
time. 14 In our experiments, we will concentrate on this E-stable SSE.
It can also be shown that, even when agents allow for announcements in
their learning rule, the steady states nL and nH are also locally stable under
learning, and are thus possible outcomes. That is, if initially expectations
N̄Lf and N̄Hf are both close to one of the two steady states nL or nH ,
then convergence will be to that steady state, rather than to an SSE. Put
differently, an SSE is an outcome of the learning rules given above only if
the initial beliefs of agents exhibit an appropriately large difference between
between N̄Lf and N̄Hf . We will discuss this further when discussing the
results below.
4 Design of experiments
As described earlier, for wages w = 0.5 there are two stable steady states at
nL = 6.25 and nH = 16 as well as an unstable steady state at n = 12.54.
In the experiments, announcements are generated using Markov transition
probabilities chosen so that ‘high’ forecasts are followed next period by ‘high’
forecasts with probability π11 = 0.8 and ‘low’ forecasts are followed by ‘low’
forecasts with probability π22 = 0.7. There is thus an adaptively stable
sunspot equilibrium in which employment switches between nL and nH de-
pending on the value of At. The objective of the experiments is to see whether
subjects can coordinate on the sunspot announcements.
In this model, the firm’s profit in the high steady state is 8 which is
higher than its profit in the low steady state (3.125). Therefore, it might
seem likely that subjects would coordinate on the high steady state. The
payoff dominance of the high steady state makes coordination on the sunspot
equilibrium challenging. To investigate this point, we also have a treatment
in which the payoffs are based on the forecast squared error. When payoffs
are based on the forecasting accuracy, the steady states are no longer payoff
ranked. 15
14For additional discussion and details of adaptive learning of SSEs, see Evans and
Honkapohja (1994) and Ch. 4.6 and 12 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
15The payoff dominance of one of the steady states in our model is a key difference
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Information about the economy We provide descriptive information
about the economy without technical details and equations16. For example,
the instructions provide the following information (instructions are available
in the online appendix). ”The producer hires labor and produces output...
The productivity of each producer depends on the average labor hired (em-
ployed) by other producers in the market. The average employment of other
producers is equal to the sum of the labor hired by each producer in the
market divided by the total number of producers. The higher the average
labor hired in the market, the higher the productivity of each individual pro-
ducer.” Thus, the subjects know the qualitative relationships between the
variables, but not the quantitative ones.
Decision making In each period t, subjects make forecasts of average
employment of the other firms Nt
e,i
. Their own optimal choice for hiring is
determined using (7).
After all subjects submit their forecasts and their employment is deter-
mined according to (7), the actual average employment of other firms Nt is
computed according to equation (5). The level of productivity, ψt, is deter-
mined based on the average employment of other firms according to equation
(3). Each session lasts 50 periods and subjects have this information.
Payoffs We conduct two treatments in which the payoffs of the subjects are
evaluated in two different ways. In the first treatment, the payoff is based
on the firm’s profit computed according to equation (6). We refer to this
treatment as the ’Profits’ treatment.
In the second treatment, the payoff is based on the forecasting accuracy of
the subjects’ forecasts. Forecasting accuracy is evaluated as forecast squared
error:
(8) FSEit = (Nt
e,i −N it )2
And forecasting payoff is computed as:
(9) FP it = max(8− FSEit , 0)
between our experiments and those in Duffy and Fisher (2005).
16This has become the standard practice in the experimental literature, for example, Lei
and Noussair (2002), Hommes et al. (2005a, 2005b), Lei and Noussair (2007), Hommes et
al. (2008), Heemeijer et al. (2009), Capra et al. (2009), Bao et al. (2011)
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where 8 is the maximum payoff when forecast squared error, FSEit , is
zero. This value was chosen to match the maximum profit of the firm in the
high steady state of the model.
In this treatment, the subjects are rewarded for their forecasting accuracy
only: as long as the subjects’ forecasts are close to the actual outcomes, they
can get the maximum payoff, and so the steady states are not payoff ranked.
We refer to this treatment as the ’FSE’ treatment.
Announcements The sunspot announcements ”Low employment is fore-
casted in this period” or ”High employment is forecasted in this period”
appear on the subjects’ screens during the input stage of the decisions. The
following information is provided to the subjects in the instructions. ”At the
beginning of each period, you will see an announcement on your computer
screen. The announcement will be either ”Low employment is forecasted
this period” or ”High employment is forecasted this period”. The announce-
ments are randomly generated. There is a possibility of seeing either an-
nouncement, but the chance of seeing the same message that you saw in the
previous period is higher than the chance of seeing a different announcement.
These announcements are forecasts, which can be right or wrong. The exper-
imenter does not know better than you what employment is going to result
in each period. The employment in each period is based on the decisions of
all subjects.”
The sequence of announcements is randomly generated by the experi-
menters before the experiment.
Practice periods Each experimental session includes 6 practice periods
during which subjects can familiarize themselves with the environment. We
also use practice periods for ’training’ (conditioning) subjects to experience
different equilibria and their payoffs and introduce the sunspot announce-
ments (as is done in Marimon et al. (1993) and Duffy and Fisher (2005)).
The training periods are set up such that subjects experience 3 periods of
high employment and then 3 periods of low employment with corresponding
announcements in each period. The average employment of other firms is
predetermined by the experimenters such that the resulting employment in
the economy is high or low. The low values are generated as 6.8 plus a ran-
dom number from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. The high values
are generated as 14.8 plus a random number from a uniform distribution with
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support [0, 1]. Subjects are not aware that the average employment of other
firms is predetermined by the experimenters. After practice periods are over,
the first announcement of the experiment is about low employment.
Information on the computer screen The forecast announcement is
given at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, data from
past periods, including the last one is presented in the table as well as in the
graph that is updated with new observation in each time period. Screenshots
are provided in Figures 2 and 3. In the Profits treatment, the table presents
the announcement, subject’s forecast and actual average employment of other
firms, subject’s output and labor costs, as well as subject’s payoff (Figure
2). In the FSE treatment, the table presents the announcement, subject’s
forecast and actual average employment of other firms, and subject’s forecast
squared error and payoff (Figure 3). The graph presents subject’s forecast
and actual average employment of other firms.
The experimental software was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Each subject sat at a personal computer station, and was not able to
observe the decisions of other subjects or interact with them. The experi-
ments were conducted at the Economic Science Institute, Chapman Univer-
sity. The participants were recruited using the Chapman online recruiting
software.
We ran two treatments - one is with payoff based on the firm’s prof-
its (Profits treatment), and the other is with payoff based on the forecast
squared error (FSE treatment). We ran 6 sessions of each treatment, with
6 subjects participating in each session (total of 72 subjects). Each subject
participated only in one of 12 sessions. At the beginning of each session,
subjects were seated at computer stations in random order. The instruc-
tions were distributed and read out loud and if a subject had any questions,
these were answered in private. Each session lasted on average 70 minutes,
including time spent on instructions. In addition to the show-up fee of $7,
subjects were paid based on their payoffs accumulated over 50 periods. The
payoffs were expressed in terms of the experimental currency with the ex-
change rate of 30 experimental currency units per $1. The average payoff in
profits treatment was $15.62, and the average payoff in the FSE treatment
was $18.50.
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5 Results of the experiment
We observe coordination on announcements (sunspots) in both of our treat-
ments. However, in both treatments, there are instances within a session, or
the entire session, where we observe a failure of coordination on a sunspot.
We first present the results observed in individual sessions for each treatment,
and then analyze the data in terms of deviations from the announcements.
We also compare the results observed in the two treatments.
5.1 Profits treatment
Figures 4 - 9 present the results of the Profits treatment for each individ-
ual session. 17 Each figure consists of two panels. The first panel presents
average employment, average forecast and the equilibrium employment cor-
responding to the announcement.18 (Note that participants were not given
the history of equilibrium employment corresponding to the announcement
on their screens. We present these series in our figures for ease of comparison
with the actual data.) The second panel presents the percentage deviations
of average employment and average forecast from equilibrium employment
corresponding to the announcement.
In session 1, the economy follows the announcements closely as can be
seen from Figure 4 where average employment is the same as the equilibrium
corresponding to announcement in most of the periods except five instances.
Figure 4 shows that the percentage deviations from the announced equilib-
rium are 0 for all periods, except for 7 periods. This means that subjects have
coordinated on the announcements. However, there is also evidence of learn-
ing during early periods of high-employment announcements. In the first
three stretches with high-employment announcements, it takes the economy
two to three periods to reach the equilibrium values.
We observe coordination on the announcements in sessions 2, 3 and 4
as illustrated on Figures 5 - 7 but with some departures from the equilibria
corresponding to the announcements and somewhat larger percentage devia-
tions than in session 1. We can also see again that learning/adaptation takes
17We report data for each session to illustrate how close the coordination is or is not,
which would be obscured by reporting average values for the treatment because of the
variation across sessions. We provide a comparison of the two treatments in Section 5.3.
18By the “equilibrium employment corresponding to the announcement” we mean nH
if At = H and nL if At = L.
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place. It appears that it is harder to switch from the low to the high steady
state, and all the figures show that it takes a bit of time for the economies
to reach the high steady state values.
Sessions 5 and 6 have instances of a lack of coordination on the announce-
ments. In session 5 (Figure 8), between periods 12 and 31 there are both
high and low announcement stretches in which average employment does not
correspond to the announcement. However, after period 32 average employ-
ment becomes close to the high equilibrium. Although it is not clear what
would have happened if session 5 had continued for more than 50 periods, it
appears possible that there would have been convergence to the high steady
state.
In session 6 (Figure 9), average employment is again initially in line with
announcements, but after period 12 employment during periods of high an-
nouncements begins to fall short of the high equilibrium and then eventually,
after period 32, average employment becomes close to the low steady state.
Again, we do not know what would have happened if session 6 had contin-
ued for more than 50 periods, but there might plausibly have been eventual
convergence to the low steady state. Other experimental studies without
sunspots have shown convergence to payoff-dominated equilibria in normal
form games (for example, Cooper et al. (1990), Van Huyck (1990)) and op-
timal growth model with increasing returns (Lei and Noussair (2007)), but
subjects in Beugnot et al. (2012) failed to coordinate on payoff-dominated
equilibrium in the presence of a sunspot. As we will discuss in section 6.1,
in our setup it is harder to switch from the low to the high steady state than
vice versa. This difficulty could be an explanation of why subjects coordinate
on low steady state.
In summary, we observe close coordination on the extrinsic announce-
ments in sessions 1-4. However, we also observe a lack of coordination on an
SSE in sessions 5 and 6, with apparent convergence to the high steady state
in one case and to the low steady state in the other case.
5.2 FSE treatment
Figures 10 - 15 present the results of the FSE treatment. Again, the data
for each session is presented in a figure that consists of two panels. The
first presents average employment, average forecast and equilibrium employ-
ment corresponding to the announcement; and the second presents percent-
age deviations of average employment and average forecasts from equilibria
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corresponding to the announcement.
In sessions presented in Figures 10-12, 14, and 15, the experimental
economies exhibit close coordination on the announcements, and the per-
centage deviations from the equilibrium corresponding to the announcement
are zero during almost all periods. In these sessions, the subjects are re-
warded for their forecasting accuracy only: as long as the subjects’ forecasts
are close to the actual outcomes, they can get the maximum payoff, and it
does not matter which steady state is the outcome as the steady states are
not payoff ranked. We can see better coordination on the announcements
and smaller deviations from the equilibrium employment than in the treat-
ment with payoff based on profits. The formal test results are presented in
section 5.3.
Figure 13 illustrates the results of session 6 in which we observe that
the subjects coordinated on the low-employment steady state by the end of
the session. During periods 14-17, 23-25, 32-41 and 47-49 the subjects ig-
nored high-employment announcements and remained in the low-employment
steady state. The lack of coordination on the high-employment announce-
ment does not cost these subjects lower payoffs because they are rewarded for
their forecasting accuracy only. Therefore, it is less of a puzzle in comparison
to the sessions in which the payoffs are based on profits.
In summary, in the sessions with payoff based on FSE we observe both
coordination on the extrinsic announcements and coordination on the low-
employment equilibrium. It is interesting to observe coordination on an-
nouncements in this treatment because the subjects could have ignored the
announcements and stayed in one of the two equilibria, and they still would
have achieved the maximum payoff. It is a matter of coordination in this
game, and the subjects coordinated on the announcements in many sessions.
5.3 Comparison of the two treatments
Next, we analyze the data and compare the two treatments. We want to
evaluate how closely the experimental economies coordinate on the announce-
ments and whether there is a difference between the two treatments.
5.3.1 Employment and forecasts
We pool the data on individual employment in periods with the low-employment
announcements and in periods with the high-employment announcements
19
separately, and pool these data for all experimental sessions for each treat-
ment. Table 1 presents the fractions of observations in the ranges containing
two equilibria; this table corresponds to the histograms presented in Figures
16 and 17.
The top left panel of Figure 16 represents the histogram of individual em-
ployment decisions during periods with high-employment announcements in
the FSE treatment and shows that employment is concentrated on the high-
employment equilibrium of 16 (83.54% of employment outcomes according
to Table 1). The top right panel of Figure 16 presents the histogram of indi-
vidual employment decisions during periods with low-employment announce-
ments in the FSE treatment and illustrates that the values of employment are
heavily concentrated on the low-employment equilibrium of 6.25 (98.23% of
outcomes according to Table 1). The bottom left and right panels of Figure
16 present the histograms of individual employment decisions during periods
with high-employment (bottom left) and low-employment announcements
(bottom right) in the Profits treatment. These histograms also illustrate that
the values of employment are very close to the equilibrium values correspond-
ing to the announcements. During periods with high-employment announce-
ments, 76.03% of the employment outcomes are close to the high-equilibrium
employment of 16; and during periods with low-employment announcements,
88.76% of the employment outcomes are close to the low-equilibrium employ-
ment of 6.25.
We also pool the data on the individual forecasts made in periods with
low-employment and in periods with high-employment announcements sep-
arately. The top left and right panels of Figure 17 present the histograms
of individual forecasts made in periods with high- and low-employment an-
nouncements in the FSE treatment and show that the forecasts are heav-
ily concentrated on the respective equilibrium values corresponding to the
announcements: 61.83% of forecasts are in the range containing the high-
equilibrium employment of 16, and 70.20% of forecasts correspond to the
low-equilibrium employment of 6.25. The bottom left and right panels of
Figure 17 present the histograms of individual forecasts made in periods
with high- and low-employment announcements in the Profits treatment and
show that the forecasts are centered around the equilibrium values, but the
fractions of forecasts in the ranges containing equilibria are much lower than
in the FSE treatment: 28.60% of forecasts are in the range containing the
high-equilibrium employment of 16, and 33.46% of the forecasts are in the
range containing the low-equilibrium employment of 6.25. In the Profits
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treatment, the subjects’ performance is not evaluated based on the accuracy
of their forecasts, therefore, we observe very high variability in the forecasts.
We will explore this in more detail in the next section 5.3.2.
Table 2 presents the data on average, median and standard deviations of
employment and forecasts in both treatments.
5.3.2 Deviations from the equilibrium employment
We would like to test how closely subjects coordinate on the announcements.
We compute the percentage deviations of employment and forecasts from the
equilibrium corresponding to the announcement for all periods and pool the
data over all sessions for each treatment. Then we test whether the two
treatments are different.
The left panel of Figure 18 presents the cumulative density function
(CDF) of the percentage deviations of individual forecasts from equilibrium
employment corresponding to the announcements in both treatments. The
CDF for the FSE treatment is larger than the CDF for the Profits treat-
ment, which is statistically significant using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(with a p-value of 0, and test statistic of 0.3827). This implies that fore-
casts are closer to the equilibrium values in the FSE treatment than in the
Profits treatment. As the subjects are rewarded based on the accuracy of
their forecasts in the FSE treatment, their forecasts are closer to the equi-
librium values than those in the Profits treatment. As illustrated by Figure
1, when forecasts are below 11.5, employment is constant at 6.25; and when
forecasts are above 13, employment is constant at 16. Thus, even if the
subjects’ forecasts are not equal to equilibrium employment, but are in the
appropriate range, their employment outcomes and profits take equilibrium
values corresponding to the low or high equilibrium. Thus the subjects in the
Profits treatment do not have to make very accurate forecasts to arrive at
equilibrium employment and profits. The shape of the employment function
explains why forecasts are less accurate in the Profits treatment than in the
FSE treatment.
The right panel of Figure 18 presents the CDF of the percentage devia-
tions of individual employment outcomes from the equilibrium employment
corresponding to the announcements in both treatments (Figure 1 explains
why the lowest value of employment is 6.25 and the highest value is 16). The
CDF for the FSE treatment is larger than the CDF for the Profits treatment,
which is statistically significant using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with p-value
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of 0, and test statistic of 0.0839). This implies that employment outcomes
are closer to the equilibrium values in the FSE treatment than in the Profits
treatment. Forecast decisions are closer to the equilibrium values in the FSE
treatment than in the Profits treatment. Because employment outcomes are
based on forecasts, employment is also closer to the equilibrium employment
in the FSE treatment than in the Profits treatment.
6 Further discussion of adaptive learning
The results of our experiments exhibit a large degree of consistency with the
adaptive learning theory results described in Section 3.3, which is a theory
that motivated our experimental study. There it was shown that an SSE
fluctuating between nH and nL is locally stable under learning, as are the
steady states nH and nL themselves. In our practice periods we ensured that
subjects saw a strong correlation between the announcement At and reported
average employment of others, N̄t. In many of the experimental sessions
this was sufficient to generate convergence or approximate convergence to
the SSE throughout the experimental session. In this section, we provide
descriptive evidence about behavior of subjects suggestive of learning during
the experiment.19
For example in the Profits treatment, sessions 1 to 3, we see initial de-
viations from the SSE in early periods, with a process of learning in which
subjects eventually closely approximate the SSE. This is seen also in session
4 of Profits treatment, but with larger initial errors: the extended sequence
of nine high announcements between periods 32 and 41, followed by five low
announcements between periods 42 and 46, appear to have been helpful in
inducing apparent eventual convergence to the SSE.
Even the cases in which there were substantial deviations from the announcement-
based SSE are illuminating in terms of adaptive learning. In session 5 of the
Profits treatment, subjects appear less certain about the relevance of the
announcement. During the sequence of high announcements between peri-
ods 14 –17 and 23 – 25, forecasts are significantly below nM = 12.5, which
implies that actual observations of average employment are less than the
average forecast, which under adaptive learning pushes agents towards nL
rather than nH . However, during the extended sequence of high announce-
19This descriptive evidence can be useful as a motivation for a formal testing of learning
mechanisms by subjects which is outside the scope of this study.
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ments in periods 32-41, subjects relearn the high equilibrium and continue
to make high forecasts during the subsequent low announcements. At the
end of session 5 it appears possible that subjects have converged on the high
steady state. These results might be consistent with some of the subjects
conditioning their learning rule on the announcements, with other subjects
disregarding the announcements and instead using a simple non-conditional
adaptive learning rule. In session 6 we see a similar pattern, except that in
the middle part of the high announcement periods 32-41, expectations are
slightly lower and this means that the even lower observed N̄t pushes fore-
casts down toward the low steady state. At the end of session 6 it appears
possible that subjects have converged on the low steady state.
Similar interpretation can be given to the FSE sessions. Evidence of adap-
tive learning is seen in several of them, particularly of the forecast of average
employment during periods of high announcements early in the experimental
session. Where there is apparent convergence to the SSE, the convergence is
quite close in several of the FSE sessions. In session 4 of the FSE treatment,
however, there appears clearly to be eventual convergence to the low steady
state. This again might be consistent with a substantial proportion of the
subjects using non-conditional adaptive learning rules.
The adaptive learning framework described and discussed in Section 3.3
can be extended in various ways. For example, one can allow for heteroge-
nous priors of subjects, i.e. allow for different subjects to have different
initial expectations and degrees of subjective uncertainty about their fore-
casts. Furthermore, more general adaptive learning rules along the line of
Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (2001), allow for heterogeneity in gains, in-
ertia and experimentation. This can greatly increase the variety of possible
paths under adaptive learning, and lead to more subtle learning dynamics
in which heterogeneous expectations can emerge. Our results appear to be
consistent with such generalized adaptive learning rules.
6.1 The role of heterogeneity in learning
Continuing with this last point, we note that when agents have heteroge-
neous expectations, learning dynamics can depend on the dispersion of ex-
pectations as well as on the average forecast. For example, even if, when the
announcement is high, most agents have expectations near the high steady
state, if there are several agents that have sufficiently low expectations, this
23
can be enough to destabilize coordination on an SSE.20 Furthermore, under
the Profits treatment, it is possible that subjects understand that their loss
function is not symmetric around a given equilibrium, and they may take
this feature into account when making their forecasts.21
Thus, how quickly subjects learn to coordinate on each announcement
may also be influenced by the fact that switching to high employment from
low employment more quickly than other subjects is costlier in terms of
lower profits than switching to low employment while other subjects still
choose high employment. How profitable choosing high or low employment
is depends on how many subjects choose high and low values.
With our parametrization, choosing high employment is relatively more
profitable than choosing low employment when five out of six subjects choose
high values (see Table 3). In contrast, if two or more subjects out of six choose
low employment, they get higher profit than those who choose high employ-
ment. Thus, the coordination on the announcement about high employment
is more demanding in terms of how many subjects need to coordinate (five out
of six) to make coordination on high employment profitable. And the coordi-
nation on low employment is relatively simpler: it requires only two subjects
following the announcement about low employment to make choosing low
employment more profitable. The technical reason for this asymmetry is the
functional form of the production function and the calibration of positive
production externality. The square root production function was chosen as
a simple production function with diminishing returns, and form and cali-
bration of production externality and wage rate were chosen to be as simple
as possible and calibrated to yield three well-spaced Pareto-ranked steady
states. Well-spaced steady states were needed for easy identification of the
correspondence of experimental results with the equilibria and for easy un-
derstanding by the subjects. Given these design constraints, the asymmetry
of the basins of attraction was difficult to avoid. With heterogeneous fore-
casts, the ”basin of attraction” is a complicated multidimensional object,
and can be a subject for future research.
Let us take a closer look at how learning happens during an experimental
20More formally, the basin of attraction of an SSE, in terms of initial expectations,
depends on the dispersion of these expectations as well as on the mean.
21“Direct criterion” versions of the adaptive learning rules, described in Section 3.3, can
be developed in which decisions or forecasts are adjusted in the direction of the decision
or forecast that would have been most profitable in the preceding period. For an example,
see Woodford (1990).
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session and at the role of heterogeneity. For example, in session 4 of the
Profits treatment (Figure 7) during periods 23-26 with high announcements,
the subjects fail to coordinate on high employment as only two or three
subjects choose high values. Next in periods 32-41, four, then five and even-
tually all six subjects choose high values. During the final sequence of high
announcements in periods 47-50, all subjects choose high values after one
period of high announcements. Similarly, subjects learn in periods with low
announcements. During periods 12-13, three and then four subjects choose
low values. In periods 18-21, three subjects choose low values in period 18,
and then all the subjects choose low values. Next in periods 26-31, five sub-
jects choose low values immediately, and then all subjects choose low values.
Thus, we can see that as the session proceeds it takes fewer periods for sub-
jects to coordinate on the announcements, i.e. the subjects learn during the
experiment.
However, coordination on the announcements does not always happen.
In session 6 (Figure 13) subjects coordinate on the low value by the end
of the session. During periods 32-41 with high announcements, only two
or three subjects choose high values. This makes choosing the low value
more profitable, and eventually all subjects choose low values. When not
enough subjects choose high values, lower profits drive them towards the low
equilibrium.
Similar dynamics are present in the FSE treatment. Coordination on the
high-employment equilibrium is more demanding because it requires five out
of six subjects to choose high values for the system dynamics to be driven
towards the high equilibrium. When less than five subjects choose high
values, average employment of others is below their forecasts which under
adaptive learning pushes them towards low equilibrium.
In session 2 of the FSE treatment (Figure 11) during periods 5-11 and
14-17 with high announcements, the subjects learn to forecast high values
after two periods during which four and then five subjects choose high val-
ues. In periods 23-25, all subjects choose high values, and in period 25 all
subjects learn the exact high-equilibrium value. In periods 32-41, everybody
chooses high-equilibrium value after one period of high announcements. Dur-
ing the final sequence of high announcements, all subjects choose the high-
equilibrium values. Similarly, the subjects learn to choose low-equilibrium
values during periods with low announcements. During periods 12-13, all
subjects choose low forecasts which are quite heterogeneous. In periods 18-
22, four and then five subjects choose the low-equilibrium value of 6.25 while
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one chooses 7. This behavior continues during the remaining periods with
low announcements (26-31 and 42-46).
In session 4 of the FSE treatment (Figure 13) subjects ignore the an-
nouncements and coordinate on the low equilibrium. It is interesting that at
the beginning of this session during periods 5-11 with high announcements,
all subjects choose high values. However, their forecasts are heterogeneous
(14.25, 14.35, 15, 17, 13.8, 15). In periods 14-17, only one subject tries the
high value for two periods and then switches to the low value. Next in pe-
riods 23-25, all the subjects choose low, heterogeneous forecasts resulting in
low employment, and in the subsequent periods with high announcements,
the forecasts are equal to the low-equilibrium value or very close to it.
7 Conclusion
We have conducted experiments in a simple, stylized macroeconomic model
with a production externality that generates multiple equilibria. The equilib-
ria are payoff-ranked – the low-employment equilibrium has lower profit than
the medium or high-employment equilibria do – which adds to the challenge
for coordination and switching between them. We observe that subjects can
indeed coordinate on extraneous announcements (a ‘sunspot’ equilibrium),
with switching between low- and high-employment states, in treatments with
two different payoff structures. When subjects payoffs are evaluated based
on forecast squared error (FSE treatment), their forecasts and employment
outcomes are closer to the equilibrium corresponding to the announcement
than they are in the treatment based on the profits. This is explained by the
functional form of the employment and a reward based on the accuracy of
the forecasts.
In our set-up coordination on the sunspot equilibrium is Pareto ranked
superior to coordination on the low equilibrium but inferior to coordination
on the high equilibrium. It is striking that in our set-up we appear able
to induce subjects to coordinate on sunspot equilibria in a high proportion
of the sessions, and that this occurs even when there exists an equilibrium
steady state that would provide higher payoffs to all agents. However, the
stability of the sunspot equilibria under adaptive learning is local, and we
also see experiments in which subjects appear to eventually coordinate on the
low or high steady state. Our results raise a number of important questions.
What would happen if the initial experience obtained in training session were
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different? Will the results be robust to the form of the externality? How
would agents react if there were a regime change in which the number of
steady states were reduced to one? Can our results be extended to dynamic
versions of the model in which agents need to forecast both the level of current
employment and the average level of employment next period? We reserve
these questions and other extensions to future research.
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Table 1: Percentage of observations in each range of values.
range FSE treatment Profits treatment
E, H E, L F, H F, L E, H E, L F, H F, L
5.5-6.5 14.71 98.23 10.19 70.20 17.28 88.76 2.78 33.46
15.5-16.5 83.54 1.64 61.83 1.14 76.03 8.84 28.60 1.77
Note: E, H = employment during periods with high-employment announcements;
E, L = employment during low announcements; F, H = forecasts during high
announcements; F, L = forecasts during low announcements.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the data.
High-employment announcements Low-employment announcements
Employment average median std skewness average median std skewness
FSE 14.46 16.00 3.51 -1.86 6.42 6.25 1.27 7.34
Profits 13.91 16.00 3.83 -1.36 7.20 6.25 2.81 2.73
Forecasts average median std skewness average median std skewness
FSE 14.35 16.00 3.21 -1.84 6.66 6.25 1.37 4.78
Profits 14.21 15.00 3.30 -1.06 7.85 7.00 3.14 1.51
Table 3: Productivity and profits of subjects forecasting low and high values.
Number of forecasters Productivity of forecasters Profit of forecasters
low high low high low high
6 0 2.5 - 3.125 -
5 1 2.5 2.5 3.125 2
4 2 2.5 2.5 3.125 2
3 3 3.1 2.5 4.65 2
2 4 4.0 3.1 6.87 4.4
1 5 4.0 4.0 6.87 8
0 6 - 4.0 - 8
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Optimal employment as a function of forecast
Figure 1: This figures presents employment as a function of forecast of aver-
age employment of others according to equation 1.
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Figure 2: Screenshot for Profit treatment.
34
Figure 3: Screenshot for FSE treatment.
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equilibrium employment according to the announcement





Percent deviations from eq−m corresponding to the announcement.
 
 
deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 4: Session 1 of profits treatment.
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Percent deviations from eq−m corresponding to the announcement.
 
 
deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 5: Session 2 of Profits treatment.
36










equilibrium employment according to the announcement
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deviation of average forecast
Figure 6: Session 3 of Profits treatment.










equilibrium employment according to the announcement
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deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 7: Session 4 of Profits treatment.
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deviation of average forecast
Figure 8: Session 5 of Profits treatment.
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Figure 9: Session 6 of Profits treatment.
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deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 10: Session 1 of FSE treatment.
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deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 11: Session 2 of FSE treatment.
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deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 12: Session 3 of FSE treatment.
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deviation of average forecast
Figure 13: Session 4 of FSE treatment.
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deviation of average employment
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Figure 14: Session 5 of FSE treatment.
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deviation of average employment
deviation of average forecast
Figure 15: Session 6 of FSE treatment.
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Employment, high empl−t announcements, FSE.






Employment, low empl−t announcements, FSE.






Employment, high empl−t announcements, Profits.






Employment, low empl−t announcements, Profits.
Figure 16: Histograms of employment during periods with high- and low-
employment announcements in FSE and Profits treatments.
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Forecasts, high empl−t announcements, FSE.






Forecasts, low empl−t announcements, FSE.






Forecasts, high empl−t announcements, Profits.






Forecasts, low empl−t announcements, Profits.
Figure 17: Histograms of forecasts during periods with high- and low-
employment announcements in FSE and profits treatments.




































































Efficiency based on FSE.




















Efficiency based on the profits.
Figure 18: Cumulative density functions of deviations of forecasts and
employment from equilibrium employment corresponding to the announce-
ments.
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